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Abstract
We investigate the impact of means tested public income transfers on post-retirement
decumulation and portfolio choice using theoretical simulations and panel data on Australian
Age Pensioners. Means tested public pension payments in Australia have broad coverage
and give insight into the incentive responsiveness of well-o⁄, as well as poorer households.
Via numerical solutions to a discrete time, ￿nite horizon dynamic programming problem, we
simulate the optimal consumption and portfolio allocation strategies for a retired household
subject to assets and income tests. Relative to benchmark, means tested households should
optimally decumulate faster early in retirement, and choose more risky portfolios. Panel data
tests on inferred wealth for pensioner households show evidence of more rapid spending early
in retirement. However they also show that better-o⁄ households continue to accumulate,
even when facing a steeper implicit tax rate on wealth than applies to poorer households.
Wealthier households also hold riskier portfolios. Results from tests for Lorenz dominance
of the panel wealth distribution show no decrease in wealth inequality over the ￿ve years of
the study.
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11 Introduction
Retirement savings systems around the world face signi￿cant pressures as populations age.1
Funded individual accumulations, older retirement ages, and means testing of public income
transfers have all been proposed as possible ways to alleviate growing demands on government
budgets. Here, we investigate the impact of means tested public income transfers on post-
retirement decumulation and investment behavior using predictions from a theoretical model
and panel data on Australian retirees. Unlike most other developed economies, the Australian
retirement incomes system incorporates a means testing regime that extends to around 80%
of elderly households, including the wealthiest deciles, and can give insight into the incentive
responsiveness of relatively well-o⁄, as well as poorer, households.
One of the fundamental hypotheses of the life cycle model is that agents will save during
their working lives and decumulate after they retire, and that those who accumulate at a faster
rate will dissave more steeply towards the end of life.2 However empirical evidence for dissaving
by the elderly is inconclusive, with many studies of cross-sectional and panel data concluding
that positive or zero saving is common (Alessie et al. 1999, Borsch-Supan 1992, Feinstein
and Ho 2000). Among the many reasons o⁄ered for this anomaly is that means tested public
income support may reduce private saving retirement by eligible and near-eligible households
and restrict decumulation after retirement.3
While it seems clear that asset testing discourages savings by low-wealth households, the
impact of means testing on wealthier households is an open question. Hubbard et al. (1995) treat
richer households as una⁄ected by means tested income support since the welfare loss generated
by meeting eligibility requirements exceeds the utility value of the payment. Neumark and
Powers (1998, 2000) ￿nd impacts on households that are ￿ likely￿to be eligible for the public
transfer while Sefton et al. (2008) ￿nd responses among lower- to middle-wealth households but
not among wealthier groups. Ziliak (2003) argues for savings responses to asset tested transfers
among the poor but not among the ￿ near-poor￿or the rich, and Hurst and Ziliak (2004) fail to
￿nd any response of ￿ at-risk￿households to reforms designed to encourage saving. By contrast,
de Nardi et al. (2006), using a dynamic model with di⁄erentiated longevity and potentially
large uninsured medical risks, ￿nd that the presence of an asset tested consumption ￿ oor has
1See, for example, Chand and Jaegar (1996), Borsch-Supan et al. (2005), Gruber and Wise (2005), Novy-Marx
and Rauh (2008), Commonwealth of Australia (2002).
2See Hurd (1990), Browning and Crossley (2001), Dynan et al. (2004) for discussion of the life-cycle model
as a representation of retirement decumulation.
3Other reasons include: precautionary saving for uninsurable medical risks leading to continued accumulation
later in life especially among the rich retired (Gruber and Yelowitz 1999, de Nardi et al. 2006); longevity and
time preference di⁄erences compounded by di⁄erent risk aversion to mortality with the rich tending to live longer
(Hurd 1990; Hurd et al. 1998); high annuity incomes combining with later life frailty (Borsch-Supan 1992, Alessie
et al. 1999); unexpectedly high asset returns, which may appear as persistent savings in short panels ; and the
desire to leave a bequest (Hurd 1990, de Nardi et al. 2006).
1￿ a large e⁄ect on the elderly￿ s saving behavior, including the richest ones.￿
How wealthy households respond to means tested income transfers is important for the design
of an optimal targeting regime. If a gentle test taper and a relatively low transfer payment mean
that richer households do not decrease their saving in order to access income support, the cost
of expanding means testing in aggregate may be low, as Sefton et al. (2008) showed for the UK
pension system. On the other hand, if income support is relatively unimportant for wealthy
retired households, then aggregate welfare might be improved by making extra transfers to the
poorer elderly via stricter testing.
Another question that is becoming more pressing as individual retirement savings accounts
increase, is the e⁄ect of asset allocation on retirement decumulation. Retired households in the
US tend to reduce holdings of most asset classes in favor of cash deposits as age increases, and
transfers of wealth into these more liquid assets are more likely after the death of a spouse and
after health shocks, events which often coincide with lower wealth (Coile and Milligan 2006).
Further, if poorer retirees tend to be heavily invested in the family home, they have less access
to consumable wealth than is indicated by their relative net worth, but richer households with
more ￿nancial wealth relative to real estate assets face fewer liquidity restrictions and enjoy a
disproportionately greater consumable wealth (Sinai and Souleles 2007). If, for precautionary
or liquidity reasons, poorer households choose to store their wealth in low-return, low volatility
assets and the family home, whereas wealthier households hold more, and more risky, ￿nancial
assets, then decumulation may be slower among wealthier households because they can bene￿t
from favorable returns shocks.
Here we contribute to the theoretical and empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of means tested
payments on the consumption and portfolio choice of retired households. The unique structure
of the Australian retirement savings system, with its broadly-targeted basic pension and limited
use of annuitization, can give insight into the incentives of means testing up the wealth distri-
bution. Using a standard CRRA utility framework and uncertain investment returns, we solve
the dynamic consumption and portfolio allocation problem of the means tested retired house-
hold. (We recognize that pre-retirement decisions are almost surely in￿ uenced by the pension
regulations, but our panel of wealth data is restricted to eligible households over the age of 65,
so we limit our study to the behavior of that group.) Simulations show that the prospect of
receiving a low-risk, means tested income payment encourages rapid drawdown early in retire-
ment. In addition, the hedging properties of the means tests motivate a risky asset exposure
that is optimally higher and more variable than the benchmark portfolio.
We evaluate these predictions using an annual series for the net wealth of Age Pension-
receiving households from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics (HILDA) panel. The
2HILDA survey does not collect wealth information at each wave, but we can make use of the
regulations surrounding the pension along with some restrictions over our sample and calculate
annual net worth over 2002-2006 from reported household Age Pension receipts. We estimate
annual dissaving rates for groups of households subject to di⁄erent means tests, and distin-
guished by bequest and precautionary motives. Further, using data on portfolio allocation from
the 2006 HILDA wave, we can compute approximate household-level portfolios and adjust sav-
ing rates for transitory shocks. Finally, we test for changes in the Lorenz inequality in the
wealth distribution using Barrett et al. (2008) tests.
2 Means tested retirement payments
Most developed economies provide ￿ ￿rst pillar￿retirement income support that is means tested
and separate from earnings-linked social security payments. US Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), for example, ensures a minimum income for those over 65 who fail to qualify for the Old
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) bene￿t. SSI is not based on work history
and apart from some exemptions (such as an individual￿ s home and vehicle, and some minimal
income concessions), the payment is strictly means tested across assets and income. Similarly,
while recent pension reform in the UK has eased eligibility for the Basic State Pension (BSP)
which is based on work history, for those who still do not qualify for the BSP or whose pension
payment is low, a safety net is provided by the means tested Pension Credit.
Further, the interaction between state pensions and private wealth is changing as govern-
ments and employers encourage saving through personal retirement accounts. In the US, 401(k)
coverage is now a substantial component of retirement provision, with contributions to personal
accounts the most rapidly growing component of private sector pension contributions since 1980
(Poterba et al. 2007). In the UK, policy reforms also emphasize individual, funded accounts
but with centralized collection and administration (Department for Work and Pensions 2006).
Plans for private accounts imply less dependence on earnings-linked social security and more
on individual wealth holdings, so that means testing, and especially asset testing, of income
transfers becomes a stronger in￿ uence over life-cycle savings plans.
Unlike the US and the UK, Australia does not have an earnings-linked, public pension sys-
tem and the Age Pension serves as both a safety net (its original purpose) and as a supplement
to individual accumulations (a more recent purpose). Alongside the Age Pension payment,
retirees receive income from voluntarily accumulations and mandatory accumulations. Since
the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992, a compulsory proportion of earn-
ings is paid into individual privately-managed accounts on behalf of employees (currently 9%).
3The majority of mandatory accumulations are still small, and while dependence on the public
pension is expected to ease as the Superannuation Guarantee system matures, the Australian
Government estimates that around 60% of elderly households will still receive a full or part Age
Pension payment by the middle of this century. Consequently, pension means tests will interact
with population aging and the ￿scal burden is forecast to rise (Commonwealth of Australia,
2002).
Further, the e⁄ectiveness of the Age Pension as an income supplement and safety net will
depend on both the total amount transferred and on how e¢ ciently transfers are distributed
among eligible households. Currently, most retired Australians qualify for some income support
with around 77% of individuals over the age of 65 (2 million people) receiving all or part of the
Age Pension (Harmer 2008). Eligibility depends on age and residency status, and payments are
tested over income and assets, but are not dependent on earnings or work history. The payments
taper slowly as wealth and income rise: individuals with up to $550 000 and married couples
with almost one million dollars of assessable assets (not counting the primary residence) can get
some support. As a result, almost 50% of eligible households are in the top half of the national
wealth distribution, and close to 14% are in the top wealth quartile. By income measures most
pensioners are less well-o⁄, with the large majority in the lowest income quartile, but even so,
more than 2% (around 50,000) are in the highest quartile (Kelly 2009).
2.1 Age Pension structure
A single pensioner who owns their own home is paid around 25% of Male Total Average Weekly
Earnings (MTAWE) and partnered pensioners receive 83.5% of the single payment each.4 Com-
pared with OECD countries providing earnings-based retirement incomes, replacement rates
based on the Pension alone are low, at 61% of the minimum net wage and 35% of net MTAWE
(Harmer 2008). Despite the low replacement, generating a similar stream of income from pri-
vate savings via commercial income stream products would require a very large accumulation
at retirement, in the order of seven times MTAWE (Petrichev and Thorp 2008).
The base single pension is recalculated every six months (March and September) to keep
up with changes in the CPI and also to ensure that it does not fall below 25% of MTAWE.
Pensioners thus hold an option on the general level of wages and prices in the economy such
that over the past decade the real pension payment has increased by around 2% p.a., which has
been su¢ cient to maintain or improve relativity with low-income working households (Harmer
2008).
Pensioners are also entitled to allowances for pharmaceuticals, utilities, telephone, rent as-
4At July 2008, the single home-owner rate was $546.80 per fortnight, or $14,217 p.a.
4sistance and for living in remote areas. They can access a concession card, which, along with
providing reduced cost medicines, introduces a range of reductions on state and local govern-
ment and utilities charges such as reduced transport fares and lower motor vehicle registration.
(Table 9 in Appendix A details the current maximum rates and additional federal government
allowances for a single pensioner.) Federal allowances alone boost the payment to single home-
owning pensioners by around 10%, and since allowances are means tested, but do not taper
as assets and earnings increase, they represent a lump sum transfer to every pensioner who
achieves eligibility, including the wealthiest.
2.1.1 Means tests
Means tests begin to reduce the pension at ￿xed levels of income and/or assets with boundaries
revised with changes in the CPI. Since the means tests may interact with each other, the
pensioner is entitled to the least payment from either test, or zero.
The assets test begins to reduce the payment when ￿nancial wealth Vt, reaches an upper
asset boundary A2 (see Table 1 ) reducing the annual pension payment by $39 per thousand
increase in wealth until the lower boundary at A1 which marks the free asset zone. Under the
income test, individuals can receive up to an additional 25% of the base pension payment in
private income before payments begin to decrease at 40 cents for each additional dollar.
Since many retirees rely entirely on ￿nancial assets for all extra income, regulators ￿ deem￿
￿xed rates of return for income from ￿nancial assets rather then relying on individuals to
estimate investment returns for the year ahead. In 2008, for example, ￿nancial assets up to a
value around $41 000 were deemed to accrue income at a rate of 4% p.a. and for all ￿nancial
assets above that value, income was deemed to accrue at 6% p.a. The deeming rules allow us to
translate the income test boundaries into an asset test equivalent form (Y 1 and Y 2) by assuming
that all income comes from ￿nancial asset returns. Table 1 details the means tests limits for a
single home-owning pensioner that applied in 2006 and 2008. Between these years the assets
test taper rate was halved, which explains the large increase in A2, whereas the reduction in
Y 2 was caused by an increase in the deemed rates of return on ￿nancial assets.5
The income test binds earlier than the assets test, at V = Y 1; but the assets test begins
to bind at the point of intersection between the two lines VI =
A2(Y 1￿Y 2)￿Y 2(A1￿A2)
(Y 1￿Y 2)￿(A1￿A2) ; becomes
the binding constraint until P(t) = 0, at V = A2: Combining the two constraints gives us the
5Some pensioners receive annuity income from de￿ned bene￿t pensions. Income from these securities is means-
tested under the income test on the basis of formulas designed to separate capital draw-down from investment
earnings. Annuity income is di¢ cult to identify separately, and also the assessment formulas have been changed
several times over the course of our sample. For simplicity we infer the wealth value of annuities by the same
method as for other income from other ￿nancial assets.
5Table 1:
Pension means tests limits, 2006 and 2008.
$ p.a.
2006 2008
Base payment P0 12 992 14 217
Income test
Cut in 3 328 3 588
Cut out 35 809 39 130
Income test - wealth
Cut in Y1 81 920 73 467
Cut out Y2 731 530 665 833
Assets test
Cut in A1 161 500 171 750
Cut out A2 328 066 540 250
Basic payment and means test limits for a single Age Pensioner who owns their own home. Income test limits
are shown in wealth-equivalents by assuming that all income is received from ￿nancial assets, and using
regulated deeming rates. Source: Centrelink.
current pension payment as a function of wealth at the beginning of period t; P(Vt);
P(Vt) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
P0 + C0
￿P0Y 2
Y 1￿Y 2 + P0





if Vt ￿ Y 1
if Y 1 < Vt ￿ VI
if VI < Vt ￿ A2
if A2 < Vt
(1)
which is piecewise linear, with changing slope at V = Y 1 and V = VI, a step increase C0 at
eligibility, and a base level payment without allowances of P0. The combined e⁄ect is shown by
the lowest section of the intersecting lines in Figure 1.
The rate of taper when computed as the implicit marginal tax rate on wealth, is higher
where the asset test rather than the income test is binding, so that means testing is slightly
progressive in wealth. Under the assets taper, a tax rate of around 4% applies compared with
2.6% for the income-test taper.
The next section includes this pension structure in a model of post-retirement consumption
and portfolio choice.
3 Model
Consider the post-retirement consumption stream and portfolio allocation for an investor with






























Fig. 1. Age pension means tests, July 2008
Figure graphs basic payment means test tapers at 1 July 2008 for a single, home-owning pensioner receiving the
Age Pension, plus pharmaceuticals, utilities and telephone allowances but disregarding one-o⁄ bonuses. Cut-in
and cut-out levels for assets and income are shown in Table 1. The income test taper assumes that all income is
earned from assessable ￿nancial assets where returns are deemed at 4% for the ￿rst $41 000 of ￿nancial wealth
and at 6% for the remainder. The pensioner receives whichever payment is least under the assets and incomes
tests. Source for regulatory boundaries and deeming rates: Centrelink.
and the investor receives no labor income but is also eligible to receive a means tested government
pension. The agent consumes out of wealth, pension payments and investment returns, investing
savings each period in one risk-free and one risky asset. In the ￿nal period all remaining wealth
is consumed, leaving no bequest.
The investor￿ s problem is to maximize utility over retirement by choosing a consumption












The investor knows St = the price of the risky security and the risk-free security at time t ,
Bt = B0(1 + r)t = B0Rt and their pension entitlement, which is a piece-wise linear function of
the wealth process Vt,
P(Vt) =
8
> > > > > > > <





if Vt ￿ ￿ V1
if ￿ V1 < Vt ￿ ￿ VI
if ￿ VI < Vt ￿ ￿ V3
if ￿ V3 < Vt
; (3)
7and can choose a non-negative monotone increasing predictable consumption strategy C =
(Ct)0￿t￿T and a predictable trading strategy ￿ = (￿t)0￿t￿T so that associated with each trading-
consumption strategy (￿;C) is a wealth process V (￿;C) = (V (￿;C))0￿t￿T : All wealth not
consumed in a given period is allocated between the risky and risk-free assets but leverage is
not permitted, so that
It := Vt + P(Vt) ￿ Ct = ￿tSt + (It ￿ ￿tSt)Bt; (4)




;￿t 2 [0;1]; (5)




; zt~ iid (￿z;￿2
z): (6)
The agent￿ s portfolio return is then
Zt := !tzt + (1 ￿ !t)R = [!t(zt ￿ R) + R]; (7)
and the value of wealth available for consumption in period t + 1 is
Vt+1 = [Vt + P(Vt) ￿ Ct][!t(zt ￿ R) + R]: (8)
Consequently the derived utility of wealth function for period t, can be written as










J [VT;T] ￿ U(VT;T): (10)
3.1 Analytical solutions without means tested payments.
When the pension payment is zero, the problem has well-known solutions. (See, for example,
Ingersoll 1997.) For log utility, where U(C;t) = ￿t ln(C;t); and ￿ is the constant discount
8factor, optimal consumption is a time-dependent proportion of current wealth
C￿ =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿T￿t+1Vt; (11)
and the optimal portfolio allocation is una⁄ected by future investment opportunities and





(~ z ￿ R)g: (12)




investment opportunity set is constant.
3.2 Numerical solutions with means tested payments
When the pension is described by equation (3), the consumption path depends on pension

















where at+1is next period￿ s optimal consumption/wealth ratio. (See derivation in Appendix B.)
















Since the value function is unknown, analytical solutions are not available and we use numerical
methods. We establish a grid of values for wealth, the state variable, in each period, and search
for optimal consumption and risky asset investment proportions at each point in the grid in
each period. Using Gaussian Quadrature to compute the value function for a given consumption
and investment strategy, we then use numerical optimization to maximize the value function
across all consumption and investment strategies at each point on the grid, then interpolate to
construct an approximate representation of the value function.
3.2.1 Parameterization
The examples set out below are representative of a few special cases and are designed to show
how the pension causes the control variables to deviate from benchmark, rather than to closely
9match observed paths. We assume preferences are described by log utility and that model
parameters are ￿xed and known with certainty. Low rates of risk aversion are supported by
micro studies of life-cycle consumption behavior (Attanasio et al. 1999, Gourinchas and Parker
2002). The real annual risk-free rate of return is set at R = 1:03, the return to the risky asset






This unusually low equity premium we choose to allow for interior solutions to the portfolio
allocation path. (Since the portfolio is constrained to the [0;1] interval to re￿ ect the borrowing
constraints of the elderly and risk aversion is low, the optimal solution is at the boundary for
typical choices of the equity premium.) We set the subjective discount factor to 0:97 for the
purposes of illustration, though much higher and more variable rates are supported by some
studies (Attanasio et al. 1999, Alan and Browning 2006). The means tests constraints used in
the simulation are set out in Table 1.
3.2.2 Simulation results and discussion
Figure 2 graphs the optimal consumption path and consumption to wealth ratio over a 20 year
horizon, assuming that the risky asset pays its expected return in each year and initial ￿nancial
wealth is $500 000. Slightly linearly increasing spending paths are optimal when there is no
pension (solid line). The dotted line is optimal consumption under the 2006 pension rules,
when the overall value of the payment was marginally lower (close to $13 000) and the implicit
tax rate over wealth was twice as high under the asset test compared with the 2008 pension.
Under the 2006 test, consumption increases until wealth reaches the cut-out level for the asset
test, A2; which is reached around age 71, then declines over the steeper taper to the point of
intersection between the income and asset tapers, VI; around age 75, then ￿ attens over the
gentler taper. Under the 2008 test, consumption decreases smoothly from high initial levels
since the steep taper applies from t = 0: It is clear that the means tests create incentives to
reduce early-retirement wealth at a faster rate than is optimal under the no-pension benchmark.
Consumption to wealth ratios are higher over the whole of retirement under the means tested
payment (Figure 3), even at times when the actual amount being contributed by the pension is
relatively small.
Figure 4 shows the impact of the tapers on drawdown rates from another perspective. Under
the 2006 tests, the steeper assets test taper applies when wealth is $330 000, the ￿ atter income
taper applies from $188 000, and the maximum amount of pension is always paid when wealth
falls below $82 000. If we set initial wealth close to each of these crucial levels, optimal drawdown
rates follow di⁄erent paths. The wealthiest household (V (0) = $300 000) is subject to the faster


































Fig. 2. Simulated consumption paths
Figure graphs simulated consumption paths over 20 years for single retiree with intial wealth of $500 000, log
utility preferences, and assuming that the risky asset pays expected return in each year. The constant discount
rate is 0.97 p.a. Pension regulations are set out in Table 1.
around 2%, ￿nally increasing the spending rate near the terminal date. The household on the
￿ atter income taper (V (0) = $190 000) begins to drawdown at 2% p.a., consuming faster than
the household receiving the full pension and not subject to any taper (V (0) = $100 000), but
much less quickly than the richer household. In e⁄ect, implicit tax rates encourage di⁄erent
rates of wealth reduction by all households depending on their accumulation at retirement,
whereas the rate of change in wealth under the benchmark (equation 11) is the same at all
initial savings levels.
Few studies have looked into the impact of pension streams on portfolio allocation. This is a
particularly interesting question for Australian retirees, the majority of whom do not annuitize
at retirement but continue to hold individual investment accounts both inside and outside the
superannuation system,6 and the issue has international signi￿cance for pension regulators who
are overseeing the transition to individual accounts from public or private de￿ned bene￿t pension
schemes. The Age Pension is a low-volatility real annuity stream with a payo⁄that is negatively
correlated with the risky asset because of the means tests. Pension entitlement therefore creates
a substitute for the risk-free asset, a hedge against other risks to wealth, encourages higher risk
exposure by bene￿ciaries, and transfers risk from individuals to the public sector. Given these
incentives, we expect the simulations to show a higher initial risky-asset weight, declining as
the retiree￿ s entitlement to future payments decreases. Two additional in￿ uences apply: ￿rst,
6Tax concessions continue to apply to accumulations kept in superannuation accounts after retirement, but
































Fig. 3. Consumption to wealth ratios
Figure graphs simulated consumption/wealth ratios over 20 years for single retiree with intial wealth of $500
000, log utility preferences, and assuming that the risky asset pays expected return in each year. The constant
discount rate is 0.97 p.a. Pension regulations are set out in Table 1.
the net present value of future pension payments declines with age, and secondly, the size of the
negative correlation between wealth and the pension depends on the steepness of the operating
means test taper.
Figure 5 shows that the optimal allocation to the risky asset is much higher when the steeper
assets-taper applies, then declines in the region of the ￿ atter taper, but still always exceeds the
baseline allocation. (The optimal allocation without the pension is 25:75 risky to risk-free asset
at all wealth levels for our parameter choice.) Overall, individuals will choose a much higher
exposure to risk, declining towards the end of life when future entitlements are decreasing.
Simulations of optimal choices under the Age Pension support higher consumption to wealth
ratios over the early and middle years of retirement and consequently much higher levels of
dissaving. In addition, the consumption insurance supplied by the hedging property of the
payment stream induces higher allocations to the risky asset until later ages.
In the next section we review the wealth and asset choice of Age Pension households in the
HILDA panel survey and compare them to the predictions of the simulation.
4 Wealth pro￿le of Age Pensioners
4.1 HILDA wealth survey data
HILDA is an annual panel survey of 7682 households begun in 2001 and designed to be represen-
tative of the Australian population. Members of households forming the permanent component



































Fig. 4. Spending rates under asset and income tapers
Figure graphs simulated optimal dissaving ratios over 20 years for single retiree at di⁄erent initial wealth levels,
log utility preferences, and assuming that the risky asset pays expected return in each year. The constant
discount rate is 0.97 p.a. Pension regulations are set out in Table 1.
die or attrit. The majority of the survey is conducted via face-to-face interview with all persons
over the age of 15 or a household representative, but for most results discussed below, households
are made up of single or couple retirees without children. Information on attitudes and some
sensitive subjects is collected from a self-completion questionnaire. To protect con￿dentiality
some variables have be top coded while others have been aggregated but these changes are not
an issue for our analysis. HILDA surveys in 2002 and 2006 included questions on household
wealth and portfolio data; here we concentrate on results from the 2006 survey.
4.1.1 Wealth and asset holdings of age pensioners
Age Pension households reported total assets below that for the general population in the 2006
survey. The full sample (here 5253 households) and Age Pension sample (796 households)
distributions of total assets are graphed in Figure 6a (log scale) as the average level of total
assets for each 20-percentile band. Both distributions are right-skewed. The median full-sample
household has total assets close to $371 000 and a net worth of $284 000,7 whereas the median
Age Pension household has around $300 000 in total assets.
Households approaching retirement (45-65 year old household heads) have more ￿nancial
assets8 than households with heads older than 65 years (Figure 6b). Households with heads
7We exclude households with negative net worth, which is the reason that the graph begins at the 7th
percentile.
8Financial assets include bank accounts, insurances, equity investments and superannuation, but exclude





























Fig. 5. Allocation to risky asset as a proportion of total investable wealth
Figure graphs simulated optimal allocation to the risky asset for single retiree with initial wealth of $500 000,
log utility preferences, and assuming that the risky asset pays expected return in each year. The constant
discount rate is 0.97 p.a. Pension regulations are set out in Table 1.
over 65 years and who receive the Age Pension have still less. This decrease across ages could
be consistent with some drawdown of savings after retirement (although we are not controlling
for cohort e⁄ects) and with targeted Pension eligibility. The median household in the 45-65
years group holds nearly three times more ￿nancial assets than the median 65+ household and
almost ￿ve times more than the median Age Pension household. (The amounts are $163 000 in
￿nancial assets for the full sample, compared with $62 000 for all over-65 years households and
$35 000 for the subset of Age Pensioners.) In the highest quintiles these di⁄erences moderate
so that the ￿nancially richest over 65s hold about 90% of the ￿nancial assets of the richest of
the 45-65 years group, whereas the highest Age Pension wealth quintile has one quarter the
￿nancial assets of the richest pre-retirement households.9
Low levels of ￿nancial assets compared with total assets shows that housing assets and
consumer durables are the majority of wealth for the median household and that the ￿nancial
assets bu⁄er is especially small for Age Pensioners.
Asset class participation data indicate that households in the lowest quintile of the full
sample wealth distribution (Figure 7a) hold their assets as bank accounts, vehicles and super-
annuation, but do not enter the property market or hold equities directly, although many poorer
households will hold equities indirectly via superannuation accounts.10 Age Pensioner house-
9Mean ￿nancial assets in the highest quintiles are $934 000, $826 000 and $246 000 respectively.
10Equity participation tends to be higher at lower wealth quintiles in Australia than in many other developed
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a. Total assets b. Financial assets
Fig. 6. Total and ￿nancial assets of surveyed households, HILDA 2006.
Fig. 6a: We stack all reporting households (5253 households) and the subset of households reporting receipt of
the Age Pension (795 households whose heads answer ￿ yes￿to PQ F12a : ￿ Do you currently receive the Age
Pension from the Australian federal government?￿i.e. FBNCAP=1) by FHWASSET DV: Household Total
Assets ($), select the 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% quantiles and graph averages of each quintile. Fig 6b: We stack
all reporting households (5253 households), households with head over 65 years (1116) and households reporting
receipt of the Age Pension (795) by FHWFIN, select the 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% quantiles and graph averages
of each quintile. FHWFIN is DV: Household Financial Assets ($), the sum of household equity investments
(FHWEQINV), cash investments (FHWCAIN), trusts (FHWTRUST), own bank accounts (FHWOBANK),
joint bank accounts (FHWJBANK), children￿ s bank accounts (FHWCBANK), redeemable insurance policies
(FHWINSUR), retirees superannuation (FHWSUPRT), and non-retirees superannuation (FHWSUPWK)
holds (Figure 7b) are more likely to hold property at lower quintiles, show lower rates of vehicle
ownership and much lower rates of superannuation participation. Rates of superannuation par-
ticipation average above 60% for all quintiles in the full survey, whereas for Age Pensioners,
it is only the top 20% of households with high rates of participation. Lower participation in
the retirement savings system by Age Pensioners re￿ ects the relatively recent introduction of
the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992 but also the preference of Australian retirees for taking
lump sum retirement accumulations out of the superannuation system at preservation age.
Figure 8a shows the gross proportional allocation of Age Pension household portfolios by
asset class. Pensioners keep a low proportion of their total assets as liquid and tradeable ￿nancial
securities, and also relatively little wealth in superannuation accounts, but hold the majority
of their wealth in property. In terms of non-property assets, we can see from Figure 8b that
exposure to risk is rising in wealth quintile for pensioner households, with a much higher average
allocation in the highest wealth quintile to equities and trusts, and superannuation (which is
typically at least 70% in growth assets).
Age Pension means tests exclude the family home and this exclusion, along with other tax
advantages for owner-occupied housing, partly explain the concentration of pensioner wealth in
housing assets. And while the majority of Age Pension households do not invest their ￿nancial
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a. All households. b. Age Pension households.
Fig. 7. Household participation by asset class, HILDA 2006
Fig. 7a: Graphs the percentage of all households in each total asset quintile (see Fig. 6a.) with non-zero
reported balances in each of the following categories: Public equity: FHWEQINV (Total shares, managed
funds, and property trusts for the household) +FHWTRUST (Total household wealth in trust funds (including
children￿ s trust funds); Safe assets: FHWTBANK (Sum of individual level bank accounts (FHWOBANK),
individual level joint bank accounts (FHWJBANK) and household level children￿ s bank accounts
(FHWCBANK) + FHWCAIN (Government bonds, corporate bonds, debentures, certi￿cates of deposit, and
mortgage backed securities owned by the household.); Insurance: FHWINSUR redeemable insurance policies;
Superannuation: FHWSUPER retirees superannuation (FHWSUPRT) + non-retirees superannuation
(FHWSUPWK); Vehicles: FHWVECH The sum of the value of transport vehicles (cars, vans, motorbikes,
tucks, utilities), recreational vehicles (boats, caravans, campervans, jet skis, trail bikes) and tractors, planes,
helicopters and other vehicles at the household level.; Property: FHWTPVAL Sum of home value
(FHWHMVAL) and other property value (FHWOPVAL) at the household level. Does not include home
contents.; Business: FHWBUSVA Business / farm assets owed by the household. Excludes assets owed by
individuals outside the household.; Collectibles: FHWCOLL Total of substantial assets such as antiques, works
of art, and collectibles for the household. Fig. 7b: Graphs the percentage of Age Pension households in each
total asset quintile (see Fig. 6a.) with non-zero reported balances in each of the categories described for Figure
7a.
wealth in growth assets, even within the retirement savings system, the wealthiest 20% keep
around 70% in equities, trusts and property. Other data on portfolio choice by Australian
retirees con￿rm this continuing taste for growth asset exposure by post-retirement investors
(Thorp et al. 2007).
4.2 Inferred wealth data
While the HILDA survey has only two waves of wealth data, for a subset of Age Pension
households we can use the means testing rules to infer a value for wealth at every wave in the
survey. Single and couple Age Pensioners who own their homes and do not participate in the
workforce must earn income largely from asset returns and annuities. We select two samples
of households from the HILDA panel, one of single and one of couple households: household
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a. All assets b. Non-home assets
Fig. 8. Portfolio share by asset class, Age Pension households, HILDA 2006
Fig.8a: Graphs the average percentage by quintile of Age Pension households￿total assets FHWASSET
allocated to each of the categories described for Fig. 7a. Fig. 8b: Graphs the average percentage by quintile of
Age Pension households￿total assets FHWASSET less the value of the home, FHWHMVAL, allocated to each
of the categories described for Fig. 7a. but where property is other property, FHWOPVAL only.
wave of the survey, owning their own home and receiving an Age Pension in every wave of the
survey. Single pensioners must live alone and have lived alone through all waves of the survey,
and likewise couples must be living together. We study households that meet these criteria in
each wave from 2002-2006 creating a balanced panel sample of 136 single-person households,
and 109 couple households.





Y 1 ￿ Y 2
P0






We treat the Age Pension payment amount reported by households as including allowances
as well as the basic payment: we assume that all households received telephone and pharma-
ceuticals allowances, and utilities allowances during 2005 and 2006, but not rent assistance
(households own their own homes), and not remote area allowance. We also include the lump-
sum ￿ one-o⁄￿bonus paid to pensioners in 2006.
During our sample, the means test taper rates vary slightly from year to year due to changes
in deemed rates of return on ￿nancial assets, so that the reduction in pension per additional
11There are two possible sources of mis-measurement: First, if the household is getting the maximum payment
then we know that their wealth is less than Y1, but we cannot infer its actual level. In our sample, very few
reported payments equal the maximum and for those that do we project the income taper slightly back into
the maximum payment region as an approximation to wealth. Second, there are sources of means-tested income
that are not generated from ￿nancial assets, including from property investments or from annuity streams. To
the extent that any realized rates of return from these assets di⁄er from the deemed rate of return, we will
mismeasure the true wealth of the household. On the other hand, we are e⁄ectively estimating their net present
￿nancial-wealth-equivalent value by backing out an approximate stock value from the income ￿ ow.
17dollar wealth under the income test was 1.6 cents in 2002 and 2003, and 2 cents over 2004-2006.
The assets test taper reduced the annual pension payment by a constant 7.8 cents for each
additional dollar assets over the whole sample.12
4.2.1 Features of the inferred-wealth panel
The majority of the Age Pensioners in our sub-sample are single and of low education, their
median age is 76 years, and more than 65% are female, characteristics matching up pretty well
to the whole population of pensioners (Harmer 2008). A large minority report fair or poor
health (Table 2).
Table 2:




single male (%) 12.2
single female (%) 43.1
high school is highest degree (%) 5.7
college degree (%) 4.1
post high school quali￿cation (non-college) (%) 25.2
did not complete high school (%) 64.6
fair or poor health 40.9
annual expenditure on medicines, prescriptions and pharmaceuticals ($) 361
Demographic characteristics of sub-sample of HILDA Age Pensioners used to create the wealth panel.
Household members must describe themselves as fully retired from paid work, over the age of 64 in the 2002
wave of the survey, owning their own home and receiving an Age Pension in every wave of the survey. Single
pensioners must live alone and have lived alone through all waves of the survey, and likewise couples must be
living together. Total sample is 136 single-person and 109 couple households.
The median value of real inferred wealth decreases between 2002-2006 whereas the means
rise (Table 3), with increasing positive skewness in the distributions. Standard deviations also
increase over the sample, suggesting that some households are accumulating while the majority
are decumulating. Estimated models of decumulation rates in the next section aim to break
down these patterns by households types and savings motives.
12We thank David Tellis from the Australian Treasury for the following sources for historical boundaries and
limits:
Rates of Pension - July 1909 to Present Date http://www.facsia.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-5/ssguide-
5.2/ssguide-5.2.2/ssguide-5.2.2.10.html
Additional Payments - April 1943 to Present Date http://www.facsia.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-
5/ssguide-5.2/ssguide-5.2.2/ssguide-5.2.2.20.html
Historical Age & Invalid (Disability Support) Pension Income & Assets Limits
http://www.facsia.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-4/ssguide-4.10/ssguide-4.10.3.html
Historical deeming rates & thresholds
http://www.facs.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-4/ssguide-4.4/ssguide-4.4.1/ssguide-4.4.1.20.html
18Table 3:
Real wealth of single and couple pensioner households ($ 000).
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
couples
mean 216.70 217.54 202.63 203.32 220.02
median 202.02 200.60 173.28 161.38 195.72
std dev 66.08 64.30 77.64 88.94 86.70
singles
mean 132.00 134.28 119.29 128.52 134.49
median 115.43 118.54 94.06 100.29 105.57
std dev 51.34 50.15 56.54 60.07 64.69
Annual summary statistics for inferred wealth, where nominal inferred values are de￿ ated by the CPI to create









boundaries (Y 1;Y 2;A1;A2) and deeming rules current for the survey year, and reported Age Pension receipts
less allowances (Pt ￿ C0) from HILDA. Single-person and couple households must meet the characteristics
described in notes to Table 2.
4.3 Panel estimation
Here we estimate the average percentage decrease in wealth over 2002-2006 for households from
our sample using panel estimation. Saving is proxied by the change in the log of inferred real
household net worth (excluding changes in the value of the family home) each period. If we
treat the pension as a linear function of wealth, we can write the di⁄erence equation for real
(optimized) wealth in equation (8) in log di⁄erences as
~ st = ~ vt ￿ vt￿1 = ln[1 + pt ￿ ct] + lnZt￿1 := d + ~ r: (16)
where vt￿1 is the log of stock of wealth in period t ￿ 1; pt is the proportion of current wealth
received as the Age Pension payment, ct is the proportion of current wealth consumed and Zt￿1
is the stochastic real gross return on investment.
However we may need to deal with transitory income shocks, especially since our sample
covers only four years of changes in wealth. Households relying on earnings from ￿nancial assets
receive transitory income in the form of unexpected variation in investment returns. Hence we




t ￿ vt￿1 = d + ￿ r (17)




19complete adjustment would be to remove the entire component of the transitory shock to get:
s￿
t = v￿
t ￿ vt￿1 = vt ￿ vt￿1 ￿ " = d + ￿ r: (18)
4.3.1 Savings subject to taper, health, bequests precaution and age.
We estimate feasible generalized least squares models of 136 single and 109 couple households
over four years as separate and combined samples. Pre-testing of the data failed to reject the
null of no ￿xed e⁄ects, and random e⁄ects estimation was not possible because the estimated
variance of the individual random error was negative. We did ￿nd signi￿cant ￿rst-order serial
correlation over the four-year sample, so the results are from a Prais-Winsten (PW) feasible
GLS estimation based on Baltagi (2005, ch5) where the correlation coe¢ cient is estimated by
the method of Baltagi and Li (1997). We estimate the following equation after pre-multiplying
all data by the (PW) transformation matrix






￿kDj;itDa;it + eit (19)
where Da;it is an indicator for asset-test taper for household i in period t and Dj;it are indicators
for general saving intentions, precautionary motives, bequest motives, health, expected health,
and newly retired (age<70). (De￿nitions and data sources for Dj;it are set out in Appendix C.)
Table 4 reports the estimated coe¢ cients and p-values for the best models.
Single-person households with less wealth, whose pension payment is subject to the ￿ atter
income taper, drawdown their savings at around 4% p.a. in real terms, and those who are
newly retired and/or in poor health spend much faster at 8-11% p.a. By contrast, wealthier
asset taper pensioners who are not newly retired are likely to be saving close to 4% p.a., or as
much as 8% if in poor health, perhaps as a precaution against future medical or nursing home
expenses, or because frailty limits his or her lifestyle. (Wealthier households are more likely to
access private medical services.)
Couples are more likely to be saving for the bene￿t of children or other relatives (probably
including partners) with signi￿cantly positive estimated coe¢ cients on the bequest indicator.
The bequest motive raises the annual saving rate of asset-taper couples to 15% p.a., and mod-
erates the dissaving of income taper couples to 5.6%. Newly-retired couple households on the
income taper do not spend down signi￿cantly faster, but asset taper couples do. The combined
sample estimates show that expected health is also marginally relevant, causing income taper
households to save and asset taper households to spend faster.




dependent variable: log change in real wealth
p-values in italics single couple combined
constant -0.036 -0.082 -0.052
0.010 0.000 0.000
asset taper 0.081 0.121 0.125
0.000 0.000 0.000
newly retired -0.041 -0.028
0.024 0.030












expected health ￿asset taper -0.054
0.062
Table shows feasible generalized least squares estimation of the log change in real inferred wealth 2002-2006 for
single-person and couple pensioner households. Data are transformed for ￿rst-order serial correlation using the
Prais-Winsten transformation described in Baltagi (2005, chapter 5) using the estimate of the serial correlation
coe¢ cient in Baltagi and Li (1997). Explanatory variables are indicators for the current means test taper
applying to the households (asset taper), household head is less than 70 years of age in 2002 (newly retired);
household says they save to help children or other relatives (bequest); at least one household member describes
current health as fair or poor (health); at least one household member expects their health to get worse
(expected health). Indicator variables for general savings intentions and precautionary savings were not
relevant.
the predictions of the theoretical model, but contrary to theory, households on the steeper taper
accumulated over this sample, rather than decumulating more rapidly. Signi￿cantly higher rates
of accumulation, despite a higher implicit tax rate on wealth, apply when we control for poor
health and bequests, suggesting that the tapers themselves are not driving more rapid spending,
whereas the prospect of more years of future higher pensions may be encouraging the younger-
retired to deplete their accumulations.
4.3.2 Savings adjusted for transitory investment income
The table below shows the average portfolio allocation for pensioners who are bound by the
income taper and for those bound by the asset taper. There is very little di⁄erence between the
21average portfolio allocations of the poorer (income taper) and wealthier (assets taper) groups,
although the distributions are very di⁄use, incorporating a wide array of portfolio structures.
In 2006, only 62 households in the combined sample are on the asset test taper compared with
184 on the income taper. Poorer households hold more wealth in consumer durables such as
vehicles and collectibles compared with wealthier ones, and we know from Fig. 8 that higher
weights to growth assets are more evident at the top of the wealth distribution.
Table 5:
Pensioner household portfolio allocation 2006 and average return, 2002-2006.
income taper % of portfolio average
equity super property other safe return
mean 13.6 14.6 7.1 25.7 39.0 6.0
median 0 0 0 12.2 25.9 6.5
std dev 24.5 25.7 24.4 30.5 34.0 2.6
skewness 1.717 1.548 3.383 1.323 0.465 -0.711
asset taper
mean 14.7 15.6 0 23.1 46.6 6.3
median 0 0 0 6.4 43.4 6.6
std dev 27.1 29.4 0 31.5 34.1 2.8
skewness 1.57 1.62 0 1.45 0.15 -0.771
We compute asset class weights by household using the 2006 HILDA wealth survey, and then generate an
annual household-level portfolio return using expected (historical average). Details of portfolio and returns
computations are set out in Appendix D.
Since some transitory income is saved, it is possibly that our short sample might be a⁄ected
by returns shocks. Using the surveyed 2006 portfolio allocations for each household we compute
portfolio returns shocks for each year by computing household-level allocations to cash and bank
deposits, superannuation and insurance, equities and trusts (including businesses), property and
consumer durables, then combining these with estimated mean-deviations of asset class returns.
Appendix D describes the computation of the portfolio returns shocks and details data sources.
When we de￿ ate wealth by these returns shock we ￿nd that the mean return surprise was slightly
smaller and less negatively skewed for wealthier households over this sample period (Table 6).
Given the size and sign of shocks it is not surprising that the estimated equations for
decumulation are substantially unchanged. We still ￿nd that less wealthy households subject
to the lower implicit tax rate of the income taper dissave more rapidly, and that wealthier
households generally save, despite paying a higher implicit wealth tax. The means test tapers
do appear to encourage a faster rate of decumulation early in retirement (Table 7).
22Table 6:
Household portfolio transitory shocks: summary statistics, 2002-2006.







We compute asset class weights by household using the 2006 HILDA wealth survey, and then generate an
annual household-level portfolio return shock as the deviation of realized return from expected (historical
average). Details of portfolio and returns computations are set out in Appendix D.
4.3.3 Test for changes in wealth equality: Lorenz dominance
Means tests are designed to target payments to the most needy, and are partly justi￿ed by
the view that the Age Pension is a safety net for the elderly poor. We compare the wealth
equality properties of the inferred wealth distribution over time using tests for Lorenz dominance
developed by Barrett et al. (2008). Tests are pairwise comparisons of the empirical Lorenz
curves in two (usually adjacent) years and inference is based on bootstrap simulation of the test
statistics adapted to the panel characteristics of the data.13
We ￿rst test to see if the wealth distribution in year one dominates that in year two:
H1
0 : L2 ￿ L1 against H1
1 : L2 > L1, and then reverse the test: H2
0 : L1 ￿ L2 against
H2
1 : L1 > L2. If there is a unique ordering so that L1 dominates L2 and L2 fails to dominate
L1 then we conclude that the wealth distribution in year one Lorenz dominates that for year
two. Increasing equality might show up as a sequence of dominance relations that move through
time, with later years dominating early ones. The table below shows the results of this test for
our pooled sample of single and couple households where couple wealth is scaled by
p
2:
Wealth inequality is not decreased over the period 2002-2006, rather the 2002 wealth dis-
tribution Lorenz dominates 2006. Year by year comparisons show that the only decrease in
inequality occurred between 2003 and 2002, which may be partly due to the e⁄ects of portfolio
allocations, since 2003 was a year of large negative returns on risky assets, whereas strongly
positive returns were recorded in 2005-2006. These results are consistent with the estimated
continued accumulation patterns of wealthier households combined with the dissaving of poorer
households.
13The empirical Lorenz curves are piecewise linear functions beginning at zero and ending at one. For a sample






i=1 given by v1 < v2 < ::: < vn￿
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mean ￿ ￿; and where the proportion of wealth observations in the sample at each value vi is ^ ￿j; the empirical










with straight lines (Barrett et al. 2008).
23Table 7:
FGLS estimation results, adjusted for returns surprise.
dependent variable: log change in real de￿ ated wealth
p-values in italics single couple combined
constant -0.039 -0.138 -0.066
0.007 0.000 0.000
asset taper 0.069 0.129 0.104
0.005 0.000 0.000
newly retired -0.048 -0.046
0.013 0.018












expected health ￿asset taper -0.079
0.049
See estimation notes for Table 4. Dependent variable here is adjusted for transitory shocks to investment
returns by household. We compute asset class weights by household using the 2006 HILDA wealth survey, and
then generate an annual household-level portfolio return shock as the deviation of realized return from expected
(historical average). We deduct the transitory shock from nominal wealth then de￿ ate using the CPI. Details of
portfolio and returns computations are set out in Appendix D.
5 Conclusions
Overall, we con￿rm results of earlier studies that wealthier households do not decumulate rapidly
in retirement, and we go further by showing that this tendency to zero dissaving or accumulation
holds when wealthier households face a steeper implicit tax rate on wealth than applies to poorer
households. Hence we demonstrate not only that dissaving rates among the wealthy are lower,
they are lower under a steeper, active means test. Our ￿ndings suggest that whatever encourages
wealthier households to save more after retirement, also dominates the saving disincentives of
the assets means tests even after controlling for bequest motives and health.
We conclude that Australian Age Pensioners decumulate during retirement on average if
they are less wealthy, but that more wealthy households, despite being subject to the incentives
of a stricter means test for pension payments, continue to accumulate. Portfolio choice appears
to have been one driver of wealthy household accumulations. While strong conclusions are
di¢ cult to draw in small samples, we ￿nd some evidence that all households subject to the
24Table 8:





2002 2003 0.803 0.030
2003 2004 0.000 0.754
2004 2005 0.059 0.897
2005 2006 0.290 0.210
2002 2006 0.000 0.974
Results of Barrett et al. (2008) tests for Lorenz dominance of the distribution of inferred wealth for Age Pension
single-person and couple households, where couple wealth is scaled by
p
2. Bold p-values show where the wealth
distribution in year j dominates the distribution in year i but the reverse dominance relation is rejected. Tests
are based on bootstrap simulation of the test statistic which allows for the panel nature of the data.
pension taper decumulate faster early in retirement, consistent with theory, and that higher
risky asset allocations are associated with higher wealth, also consistent with our theoretical
model. However there is little evidence for the view that the means tests create increasing
equality in the wealth distribution over time.
25Appendix A: Age Pension payments and allowances
Table 9:
Payments and allowances for Single Age Pensioners
Age Pension and Related Bene￿ts Regular Payment Annual value Adjustment
Age pension payment $547 fortnightly $14217 max(CPI, 0.25￿MTAWE)
Pharmaceuticals allowance $6 fortnightly $151 CPI
Rent assistance $107 fortnightly $2782 CPI
Telephone allowance $22 quarterly $88 CPI
Utilities allowance $125 semi-annually $500 CPI
Remote area allowance $18 fortnightly $473 by legislation
Senior Bonus payments $500 one-o⁄ payments
Pensioner Concession Card Access to Pharmaceutical Bene￿ts Scheme plus reductions for
state and local government charges e.g. water and property
rates, energy bills, public transport fares, motor vehicles registration
Note: Table shows basic payment and allowance schedules for a single Age Pensioner as at 1 July 2008.
Partnered pensioners receive 83.5% of the single rate basic payment. Source: Harmer (2008).
Appendix B: Derivation of policy functions
The consumer￿ s problem is to maximize utility from retirement until the end of life by choosing
consumption Ct and risky asset investment !t subject to the wealth and pension processes
described by equations (8) and (3), so that derived utility of wealth is









J [VT;T] ￿ U(VT;T):
Beginning with the second last period,
J [VT￿1;T ￿ 1] = max
C;w
U(CT￿1;T ￿ 1) + ET￿1[U(VT;T)]: (A-1)
The ￿rst order conditions in the controls C and ! are:
0 = UC(C￿
T￿1;T ￿ 1) ￿ ET￿1fUVT
￿
!￿
T￿1 (zT￿1 ￿ R) + R
￿
g (A-2)
0 = ET￿1fUVT (zT￿1 ￿ R)g: (A-3)
26Using the de￿nition of Zt; and It;and the ￿rst order conditions, we can write:
ET￿1(UVTzT￿1) = RET￿1(UVT) (A-4)
and also
UC = !￿
T￿1ET￿1(UVTzT￿1) + (1 ￿ !￿
T￿1)RET￿1(UVT) (A-5)
so that at the optimum,
UC = RET￿1(UVT): (A-6)
With two years to go, the investor solves
J(V;T ￿ 2) = maxU(C;T ￿ 2) + ET￿2[J(VT￿1;T ￿ 1)]: (A-7)
By substituting optimal C￿ and !￿into the original problem, and di⁄erentiating with respect
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+ ET￿1 (UVTZ￿): (A-8)
The ￿rst two terms in this expression are zero at the optimum, which results in the envelope
condition:
JVT￿1 = ET￿1 (UVTZ￿)(1 +
@P
@VT￿1




This envelope condition di⁄ers from the standard problem by the e⁄ect of the partial deriv-
ative of the pension with respect to current period wealth. The value of the partial derivative
depends on where the agent ￿nds themselves in pension-wealth space. If the agent is in the
highest wealth region ￿ V3 < Vt, the pension payment is a constant zero and the partial derivative
is zero. In the next two lower wealth regions ￿ VI < Vt ￿ ￿ V3 and ￿ V1 < Vt ￿ ￿ VI; the pension
reduces linearly in wealth, and @P
@VT￿1 = ￿i is a negative constant. In the ￿nal region Vt ￿ ￿ V1;
the agent receives the ￿xed full pension payment P0 and the partial derivative is again zero.
If the agent￿ s preferences are described by U(C;t) = ￿tC
￿
￿
; as for the conventional CRRA
investor, in the ￿nal period the consumption decision is given by
UC = ET￿1[UVTZT￿1]; (A-10)
27and since UC = ￿T￿1C
￿￿1
T￿1 and U(CT) = U(VT) = ￿T ((VT￿1+P(VT￿1)￿CT￿1)ZT￿1)￿




T￿1 = ET￿1[￿T(VT￿1 + P (VT￿1) ￿ CT￿1)￿￿1 (ZT￿1)
￿￿1 ZT￿1];
and rearranging for CT￿1;



























￿￿1 zT￿1] = RET￿1[(ZT￿1)
￿￿1]. (A-12)
and we note that the optimal portfolio weights are independent of current consumption at
t = T ￿ 1.
To ￿nd a general form for J(V;t) we begin with the envelope condition:
JVT￿1 = UC(1 +
@P
@VT￿1





Integrating this up over V ,














At this point we use the result that P (VT￿1) is piece-wise linear so that @P
@VT￿1 is either zero
or a constant depending on the region of VT￿1; so we can write












Again using the result that @P
@VT￿1 is either zero or a constant, we can write the solution to
28the integral as






















Now solve this problem for time T ￿ 2:
J(VT￿2;T ￿ 2) = max
C;!




























(VT￿2 + P (VT￿2) ￿ CT￿2)ZT￿2




















































noting that consumption depends on current and future investment opportunities through
ZT￿2 and aT￿1:
If we de￿ne at using a feedback rule over the optimized value of consumption so that at :=
C￿
t
































IT￿2 [!T￿2 (zT￿2 ￿ R) + R]






















































































The optimal trading strategy ! (￿) therefore depends on future investment opportunities
via aT￿1 and the current consumption strategy via I￿
T￿2:
Appendix C: De￿nitions of panel survey indicator variables
health = 1 if at least one household member reports general health as ￿ fair￿or ￿ poor￿ , and zero
if ￿ good￿ , ￿ very good￿ , ￿ excellent￿or declined to comment.
expected health = 1 if at least one household member answers true to ￿ I expect my health
to get worse￿ .
savings = 1 if household answers the question ￿ Which of the following statements comes
closest to describing your (and your family￿ s) savings habits?￿as
￿ Save whatever is leftover - no regular plan
￿ Spend regular income save other income
￿ Save regularly by putting money aside each month
precautionary = 1 if the household answers yes to at least one of the following questions
in the 2002 wave: ￿ Which of the following comes closest to describing your (and your family￿ s)
current reason for saving? 1. For emergencies/in case of unemployment or illness and/or 2.
Medical/dental expenses.
30bequest = 1 if the household answers yes to at least one of the following question in the
2002 wave: ￿ Which of the following comes closest to describing your (and your family￿ s) current
reason for saving? 1. Education for children and grandchildren and/or 2. To help children or
other relatives.
Appendix D: Portfolio construction and returns calculation
Household portfolios, returns and returns surprises.
To adjust for transitory shocks to household wealth we construct wealth measures for each
household for each year. We begin with the raw data underlying Figure 8b from which we
calculate the portfolio weights in 2006 for the categories:
￿ Equity: public equity + business
￿ Superannuation: superannuation + insurance
￿ Property: adjusted property series excluding the value of the family home
￿ Other: vehicles + collectibles
￿ Safe assets
This will create a vector of portfolio weights summing to one for each Age Pension household
for 2006. Next we use these weights to compute a household speci￿c transitory shock series for
each of the survey years 2002-2006, assuming that the 2006 weights were also true for the
preceding years in the sample.
We compute expected returns as the annualized average of quarterly returns to represen-
tative benchmark indices for December 1989 to December 2006. Returns for each portfolio
component are calculated as follows:
￿ Equity: returns are a weighted average of Australian and international equity indices,
0:3Aust:Equity + 0:7Int:Equity
where the Australian equity return is from the DataStream Australian Total Market Re-
turns index (TOTMKAU) and the International Equity return is from the MSCI AC
World EX AU (AUD)
￿ Property: returns to DataStream S&P/ASX 300 Property price index, (ASG3PTZ)
31￿ Other: Value of Household sector Consumer Durables from Reserve Bank of Australia
Bulletin Historical Table B20, adjusted for transactions. Return is computed as change
in the (residual) valuation e⁄ect. (Available from the authors on request).
￿ Safe assets: returns to DataStream UBS Australian Bank Bills, all maturities, total returns
index, (ABNKBLI)
￿ Superannuation: Returns to superannuation and insurance are computed as a weighted
average of underlying benchmark returns using the portfolio weights of the default super-
annuation portfolio as reported in APRA INSIGHT 2007(2) Table 14, June 2004. The
return is
0:437Aust:Equity + 0:228Int:Equity + 0:178Aust:Bonds + 0:078Property + 0:079Cash
where the indices for each asset class are those described above and where the bond return
is the UBS Australian composite bond index, total returns (ACIALLM).
The annualized average return and the annual deviation from that expected return are set
out in Table 10 below
Table 10:
Expected returns and transitory shocks by asset class, 2002-2006.
Equity Super Property Safe Assets Other
shock % p.a.
2002 -3.92 -4.24 -0.93 -0.56 -1.97
2003 -10.40 -10.43 -0.74 -1.94 3.46
2004 -33.12 -25.10 -4.12 -2.00 -0.18
2005 9.55 2.91 0.17 -1.86 -2.02
2006 11.46 5.23 12.42 -1.13 -1.89
expected return % p.a.
9.65 10.25 6.51 6.73 0.46
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